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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
With respect to respondent Jon Dunn, the only issue on 
appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in denying plain-
tiff's motion to join third-party defendant Jon Dunn as a party 
defendant in a new cause of action after the applicable statute 
of limitations had run. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment and, by proposed 
amendment, for damages sustained to uninsured personal property 
resulting from a fire-bombing incident. The plaintiff Tony Vina 
brought a declaratory judgment action against Jefferson Insurance 
Company of New York (hereinafter JEFFERSON) and its local general 
agent, Transwestern General Agency (hereinafter TRANSWESTERN), 
praying for a declaration that the premises in question were cov-
ered by property damage insurance at the time of the loss and 
that the defendants had an obligation to adjust and pay the loss. 
JEFFERSON filed a cross-claim against TRANSWESTERN and a third-
party action against the writing agent, Jon Dunn (hereinafter 
DUNN). 
Shortly before trial, plaintiff moved to file an amended 
complaint which would join DUNN as a party defendant and add a 
"THIRD CLAIM" for money damages against DUNN. JEFFERSON, TRANS-
WESTERN and DUNN stipulated that the complaint could be deemed 
amended to include a claim for actual damages as to JEFFERSON 
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and TRANSWESTERN, provided the damages issue was bifurcated for 
trial since there had been no discovery on that issue. DUNN re-
sisted plaintiff's motion to join him as a party defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to The Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting 
without a jury. Plaintiff's motion to join DUNN as a party defen-
dant was argued at the commencement of trial, taken under advise-
ment and later denied. At the conclusion of the case, the court 
entered judgment in favor of defendants JEFFERSON and TRANSWESTERN 
and, consequently, dismissed JEFFERSON'S cross-claim against TRANS-
WESTERN and its third-party complaint against DUNN. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Third-party defendant DUNN acknowledges that the factual 
statement of plaintiff is essentially correct. The facts per-
taining to plaintiff's Point III, which is the only point directed 
against this third-party defendant, are as follows: 
1. The request for cancellation of the policy in question 
was submitted to TRANSWESTERN by DUNN on or about November 15, 
1979 (Ex. 4-P) and TRANSWESTERN on behalf of JEFFERSON cancelled 
the policy effective November 28, 1979 (Complaint, 17, R.3). 
2. The property in question was destroyed by fire on De-
cember 31, 1979 (Complaint, 1f9, R.3). 
3. JEFFERSON denied coverage for the loss in question 
and plaintiff filed a complaint with the Utah Insurance Commission 
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which on September 30, 1980 conducted a hearing in which DUNN 
testified regarding his activities in procuring and cancelling 
the policy in question (R.391). 
4. Plaintiff initiated this action by the filing of a 
complaint on February 19, 1982 which prayed only for declaratory 
relief and named only JEFFERSON and TRANSWESTERN as defendants 
(R.2-5). In conjunction with its answer, JEFFERSON filed a third-
party complaint against DUNN alleging that DUNN "was an indepen-
dent agent with agency authority through Transwestern General 
Agency" and that he "took the initial application for insurance 
from the plaintiff and was also responsible for the cancellation 
of said policy." (R.18). 
5. On June 24, 1985, the court entered a scheduling order 
providing that motions to amend pleadings "shall be heard by Aug-
ust 30, 1985. After this date such motions shall be heard only 
upon a showing of extremely exceptional circumstances." (R.36). 
6. Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to add DUNN 
as a defendant was not filed until September 3, 1985 (R.44) and 
was not heard until the commencement of trial on October 1, 1985 
(R.153-185). 
7. Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint (R.52-59) added 
a THIRD CLAIM against DUNN personally, alleging, inter alia, that 
DUNN: 
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(a) was at all times referred to herein an agent 
for Defendants Transwestern General Agency and Jefferson 
Insurance Company, (14), [and that he] 
(b) breached a duty he had to the plaintiff to prop-
erly complete the application of insurance listing the 
defendant as a co-insured on the policy or an insured with 
an insurable interest in said policy to receive notifica-
tion of any and all changes and/or cancellation of the 
insurance policy. The defendant, John Dunn, negligently 
listed the plaintiff, Tony Vina, as a partner with the 
co-insured, Beverly Pencille, instead of properly listing 
him as an additional insured, even though he had prior 
knowledge of the relationship between the co-insureds and 
that the insurance was written on the personal property 
at the plaintiff's place of business (119). 
The prayer of the amended complaint in addition to praying for 
declaratory relief against all defendants, prayed !f[f]or judgment 
against the defendant, Jon Dunn, for any and all losses sustained 
by the plaintiff as a result of the fire on the premises, includ-
ing damage to his personal property and loss of earnings thereon.ff 
(15, R.58). 
8. The court took plaintiff's motion to amend his com-
plaint to join DUNN as a party defendant under advisement (R.184 
& 185) and on October 2, 1985 at the end of the morning session, 
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the court denied plaintiff's motion to join DUNN as a party defen-
dant on the grounds (1) that the cause of action alleged against 
DUNN in the amended complaint was different from that alleged 
against him in the third-party complaint and (2) that the motion 
was untimely (R.470). 
9. At the conclusion of the evidence, defendant JEFFERSON 
moved for an involuntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 
41b, U.R.C.P., (R.491) which was joined in by defendant TRANS-
WESTERN (R.498). The court granted the motions (R.516), holding, 
• . . I think there was a partnership 
by estoppel based primarily on the repre-
sentations made by Mr. Dunn to the insur-
ance agency and to the insurance company 
wherein he represented on the question-
naire form and on subsequent communica-
tions that they were a partnership. 
In addition to those representations 
made by Mr. Dunn, there are some facts 
done by the insureds themselves, specifi-
cally when Ms. Pencille reduced the cover-
age on the policy with Mr. Vina's appro-
val, and that was done solely by her sig-
nature. I think that was a representation 
of the company, and that she had authority 
to deal in insurance matters for both 
the insureds. 
Also the address on the policy which 
was received both by Ms. Pencille and 
Mr. Vina indicated that, that it was Bev-
erly Pencille and Tony Vina doing business 
as this tavern, and that's an indication, 
I think, that they are both in that tavern 
business, and that any notice would just 
go to the tavern. And I think that is 
a sort of representation, too, that they 
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allowed that to come. They didn't say 
anything about it and dealt in that fash-
ion. I think that's a representation 
to Jefferson and to the agent that would 
support a finding of partnership [by] 
estoppel. (R.518-518). 
10. The trial court's holdings were then reduced to a 
formal JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE entered on December 
4, 1985 dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's causes of action 
against JEFFERSON and TRANSWESTERN and, consequently, JEFFERSON's 
cross-claim against TRANSWESTERN and its third-party complaint 
against DUNN. (R.136-137). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion to add 
DUNN as a party defendant because the claim sought to be asserted 
against him was (1) barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tion, (2) a substantially different cause of action than that 
alleged against him in the third-party complaint, (3) being as-
serted by the plaintiff who had no identity of interest with the 
third-party plaintiff who originally sued him and he had no iden-
tity of interest with the defendants originally sued by the plain-
tiff, but was in fact on the opposite side of the insurance trans-
action in question and (4) urged by a motion not timely filed 
or heard as required by the trial court's scheduling order. 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST JON DUNN IS 
TIME-BARRED. 
The fire in question occurred on December 31, 1979, as 
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noted at paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint (R.54-55). Plain-
tiff's motion to file the amended complaint which purported to 
join DUNN as a party defendant was filed September 3, 1985 (R.44), 
almost six years after the loss. The Third Claim directed to 
DUNN personally alleges damages to personal property and prays 
to recover the amount of such damages and the loss of income which 
would have been derived therefrom (R.57). 
Section 78-12-26(2), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, requires 
that f,[a]n action for taking, detaining or injuring personal prop-
erty, . . ." be commenced within three years. There is no allega-
tion or contention that the statute was tolled by any conduct 
of DUNN. To the contrary, DUNN was always within the state of 
Utah following the loss in question and testified regarding his 
involvement in the writing and cancelling of the policy in ques-
tion before the Insurance Commissioner on September 23, 1980, 
less than one year after the loss and more than two years before 
the statute of limitations expired. Clearly, plaintiff's claim 
against DUNN is time-barred unless the "relating back" provisions 
of Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., apply. DUNN contends that they do not, 
as discussed hereafter. 
POINT II. 
THE "RELATION BACK" PROVISIONS OF RULE 
15(c) ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., states that: 
-7-
Whenever the claim or defense asserted 
in the amended pleadings arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth 
in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original 
pleading. 
As worded, the rule permits only amendments to the claims or de-
fenses of parties to the original pleadings and does not permit 
the substitution or addition of parties. In Doxey-Layton Co. 
v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (1976), this Court stated the general rule 
as follows: 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not 
apply to an amendment which substitutes 
or adds new parties for those brought 
before the court by the original plead-
ings-whether plaintiff or defendant. 
This for the reason that such would amount 
to the assertion of a new cause of action, 
and if such were allowed to relate back 
to the filing of the complaint, the pur-
pose of the statute of limitation would 
be defeated. 
Id. at 906. However, the court noted that there is an exception 
to this rule: 
The exception operates where there is 
a relation back, as to both plaintiff 
and defendant, when new and old parties 
have an identity of interest; so it can 
be assumed or proved the relation back 
is not prejudicial. . . . 
This necessary identity of interest was most recently ex-
plained in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., et al, 681 P.2d 
214 (Utah 1984), where Perry, the subcontractor sued by the gen-
eral contractor for installing defective doors, brought a third 
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party action against Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., the supplier, 
and Payne Lumber, the manufacturer of the doors. The supplier 
and manufacturer moved for summary judgment on the third-party 
complaint on the basis that it was barred by the four-year statute 
of limitations set forth in S70A-2-725, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
The trial court granted the motion and this Court affirmed, citing 
with approval the aforementioned rule from Doxey-Layton, supra, 
and noting that: 
'Identity of interest1 as used in this 
context means that the parties are so 
closely related in their business opera-
tions that notice of the action against 
one serves to provide notice of the action 
to the other. Such an identity exists, 
for example, between past and present 
forms of the same enterprise. See, Spiker 
v. Hoogeboom, Colo. App., 628 PTTcT 17/7 
179 (1981). In this case, there was no 
evidence showing any identity of interest 
between the original plaintiff, the defen-
dant, and the third-party defendants other 
than privity of contract. This is an 
insufficient identity of interest for 
the purpose of Rule 15(c). If any third-
party action automatically related back 
to the date of filing of the original 
complaint, Rule 15(c) would become an 
all-encompassing rule that would eliminate 
all limitations on third-party actions. 
The law is otherwise. 
As in Perry, _a fortiori, in the instant case there is no 
identity of interest between the original defendants JEFFERSON 
• and TRANSWESTERN and third-party defendant DUNN. In fact, their 
interests and responsibilities were diametrically opposed in the 
transactions that gave rise to this lawsuit. TRANSWESTERN was 
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JEFFERSON'S general agent and responsible for determining that 
JEFFERSON'S underwriting requirements were met in issuing the 
policy in question, whereas DUNN, by statute,— was the agent 
of VINA and responsible for determining that his needs were met 
in securing the policy in question. As the trial court noted: 
. . . I find that Dunn was the agent in 
this case of Mr. Vina and Ms. Pencille. 
That not only under the Insurance Code, 
but under the ordinary principles of prin-
cipal and agent law, he was acting in 
their behalf in procuring the insurance. 
(R. 517). 
Because DUNN's duty was to VINA and not to JEFFERSON, the 
third-party complaint of JEFFERSON against DUNN under the initial 
complaint which prayed only for declaratory relief was rather 
innocuous, whereas the amended complaint which focused on DUNN's 
duty to VINA as his agent and prays for monetary relief against 
him in the Third Claim is an entirely different claim and would 
subject DUNN to a potentially much greater liability exposure. 
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that the claim he was asserting 
in the Amended Complaint is "quite a different cause of action 
than is asserted in the Third-party Complaint." (R.163). To 
permit such amendment would effectively negate the applicable 
2 / 
statute of limitation— contrary to the guidelines set down in 
Perry to govern such situations. Therefore, the trial court's 
1. §§31-17-2 and 31-17-33, U.C.A. (1953). 
2. §78-12-26(2), U.C.A. (1953). 
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denial of plaintiff's motion to amend to add DUNN as a party defen-
dant should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO AMEND FOR BEING UNTIMELY. 
Even if the proposed amendment to the complaint to add 
DUNN as a party defendant was not time-barred because of asserting 
a new and different cause of action, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the motion to amend as being untimely. 
The trial court had previously ordered that motions to amend plead-
ings "shall be heard by August 30, 1985. After this date such 
motions shall be heard only upon a showing of extremely excep-
tional circumstances." (R.36). The motion was not heard until 
the commencement of trial on October 1, 1985 and at such hearing 
no "extremely exceptional circumstances" were alleged or shown. 
(R.164-168). 
The court took the motion under advisement and the next 
day denied it on the grounds that the cause of action alleged 
in the Amended Complaint against DUNN was different than the cause 
of action alleged against him by JEFFERSON in the Third-party 
Complaint and that the motion was not timely presented and heard 
as required by the scheduling order entered by the court on June 
24, 1985. 
Even in cases where the new cause of action would not be 
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time-barred against the party to be added, trial courts have been 
held to have broad discretion in denying such motions. In United 
States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), the government 
brought an ejectment action against individuals claiming ownership 
in a wildlife refuge and the defendants sought to join Mcintosh 
County and various county officials. The trial court denied the 
motion and on appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted: 
The district judge appropriately consid-
ered that joiner would not serve the in-
terests of judicial economy in view of 
the late stage of the proceedings and 
the lack of any disadvantage to defendants 
in bringing their claims in a separate 
action. . . . 
And, in Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 
et al., 590 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1978), where a college professor 
brought an action against the college for damages arising from 
his improper termination and shortly before trial sought to join 
the trustees in their individual capacities, the Third Circuit 
observed with respect to the timeliness issue: 
. . . Moreover, Skehanfs motion was not 
filed until a short time prior to the 
scheduled date of trial on his remaining 
substantive claims. In light of the dis-
trict court's careful consideration of 
these factors we cannot find the court's 
denial of Skehan's motion for leave to 
add the individual members of the Board 
of Trustees as named defendants in his 
complaint to have been contrary to the 
sound exercise of its discretion. 
In this case, while the substantive objection that to allow 
-12-
plaintiff to join DUNN in the proposed Third Claim of the Amended 
Complaint would in effect negate the applicable statute of limita-
tion is certainly the most supportable reason for denying plain-
tiff's motion, a trial court is certainly within its discretion 
to deny the joiner of a party as a defendant on a new claim not 
presented for argument until the morning of trial. For this addi-
tional reason, the order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts, points and authorities, 
third-party defendant DUNN seeks affirmance of the judgment below 
and his costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of January, 1987. 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Jon Dunn 
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